

**Top Secret**



25X1

DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE


# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

State Dept. review completed

**Top Secret**

c 196

16 November 1970



25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017600010002-4

Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017600010002-4

16 November 1970

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

## *CONTENTS*

USSR-BERLIN: Chances of progress at today's four-power ambassadorial meeting are not good. (Page 1)

25X1

USSR-BERLIN: The hard line taken by Soviet representatives on 13 and 14 November suggests that little or no progress will be made at the ambassadorial-level meeting on Berlin today.

Friday's eight-hour working session of four-power advisers got off to a bad start when the Soviet representative chose to discourse at length on the shooting incident at the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin earlier in the week. On substantive issues, the meeting bogged down over the crucial issue of access and the problem in particular of defining the roles of the East and West Germans in working out specific arrangements. The Soviets rejected a Western draft for a four-power statement that would have laid down fairly detailed guidelines for the forthcoming talks between Bonn and Pankow on access arrangements, insisting instead that the four powers should establish only very general guidelines.

At an informal meeting with their US colleagues on 14 November, the Soviet representatives warned that today's ambassadorial meeting will "not be unlike" the 9 October session--a meeting at which Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov took an extremely unyielding stance on all issues. The Soviet representatives also contended that the main purpose of a four-power agreement should be to stabilize existing access arrangements, not to improve them.

The Soviets will almost certainly return to these matters at today's ambassadorial meeting. The Western ambassadors are under some pressure because of the prospect that bilateral talks between Bonn and Pankow will probably begin in the near future, with or without four-power guidelines. Soviet tactics suggest Moscow may believe that the coming talks might effectively supplant the four-power discussions and produce agreements more favorable to Soviet interests than could otherwise be obtained.

25X1

25X1


Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017600010002-4

**Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017600010002-4

25X1

**Top Secret**



**Top Secret**